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Christie Provost Peters, Consultant
OVERVIEW — This background paper is a primer on the prescription drug
market. It provides information on the fundamentals of the pharmaceutical
industry and various marketplace stakeholders, including manufacturers,
retailers, consumers, regulators, researchers, and purchasers. This paper also
examines the various ways the federal government interacts with the pharmaceutical market. Due to the breadth of material addressed, some complex
issues and relationships are presented in broad conceptual terms without
extensive technical detail.
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Fundamentals of the
Prescription Drug Market

For millions of Americans, prescription drugs save lives, ease suffering,
reduce disability, and restore vitality. Vaccines have virtually eliminated
the threat of horrible diseases, such as polio, diphtheria, and whooping
cough, that once made childhood a more precarious time of life. Protease inhibitors can commute the death sentence that HIV infection once
conferred; antipsychotic medications allow many mentally ill persons
to live full, productive lives in their communities; and beta blockers can
help prevent repeated heart attacks. These are only a few examples of
the many medical “miracles” that have built the public’s faith in and
expectations for pharmaceutical interventions.
The history of pharmaceuticals is replete with success stories, but prescription drug products and the miracles they enable come with a hefty
price tag. In 2002, over $160 billion was spent on prescription drugs in
the United States, representing a fourfold increase since 1990.1 Already
high costs of prescription drugs continue to rise, alarming consumers,
motivating private and public purchasers to establish aggressive cost
control measures, and stimulating Congress to enact major policy
changes. Although the importance of prescription drugs to modern
medicine is well accepted, some critics question whether current spending levels and prescribing patterns are an efficient use of the already
stretched health care dollar.
Though the factors driving the growth of prescription drug spending and
the impact of such growth on coverage and access are a source of debate,
few question the benefits of a robust, innovative pharmaceutical market.
New pharmaceutical treatments and those in development offer hope to
the sick and may ultimately reduce the burden of disease. Prescription
drugs can facilitate cost-effective management of chronic illnesses and
may potentially minimize “downstream” costs associated with hospitalizations and other health crises. Advances in science such as gene therapy,
cell regeneration, therapeutic cloning, and the completion of the human
genome sequencing provide hope for the prevention and treatment of
disease in the future.
Policy efforts to influence the pharmaceutical market are complex and contentious, as with any high-stakes endeavor. The narrow passage of the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA)
of 2003 and the continuing debate over the importation of prescription drugs
reflect the strongly held—and often conflicting—views and interests of
patients, providers, payers, manufacturers, researchers, regulators, and
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investors. This paper does not attempt to mediate these interests or
advocate for any of these perspectives; it is intended to provide a descriptive overview of the prescription drug market, examine the roles of
the various parties that contribute to this market dynamic, and alert the
reader to disputed issues.
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TABLE 1
U.S. Prescription Drug Sales
Growth Rate
Year

Growth (%)

1999

18.8

2000

14.9

Growth Trends

2001

16.9

Although they account for a relatively small portion of total health
spending, expenditures for prescription drugs are growing faster than
any other major health care sector. Hospital and physician services represent the largest shares of total health care spending: 31 percent and 22
percent of total expenditures, respectively. Although spending on prescription drugs has been a distant third, accounting for 11 percent of
total U.S. health care spending in 2002,2 it grew by 15.3 percent in 2002—
an increase that far outpaced spending increases in hospital (9.5 percent) and physician (7.7 percent) services.3 Analysts expect this trend to
continue over the next 10 years.

2002

11.8

2003

11.5

MARKET DYNAMICS

Increases in both utilization and price contribute to the recent growth in
prescription drug spending, although the relative contribution of each
is unclear. Utilization increases have been attributed to a wide variety
of factors, including the growth in the number of elderly persons, the
introduction of new drug products, the marketing practices of manufacturers, and the increase in consumer awareness and empowerment.
The rationale behind the large increase in prescription drug use is hotly
debated, and conclusive evidence pinpointing the driving factors
remains elusive. The extent to which price increases spur overall spending increases is also controversial. Many contend that the introduction
of new drug products—often significantly more expensive than the products they replace—is at least partially responsible for the growth in
prescription drug spending.

Source: IMS Health, “U.S. Total Sales
Growth, 1996-2000,” available at
www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/
articleC/0,2777,6599_40054593_
1004844,00.html; “IMS Reports 16.9 Percent
Growth In 2001 U.S. Prescription Sales,”
available at www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/
front/articleC/0,2777,6599_3665_
1003965,00.html; “IMS Reports 11.8%
Dollar Growth in 2002 U.S. Prescription
Sales,” available at www.imshealth.com/ims/
portal/front/articleC/0,2777,6599_3665_
41276589,00.html; “IMS Reports 11.5 Percent Dollar Growth in '03 U.S. Prescription
Sales,” available at www.imshealth.com/ims/
portal/front/articleC/0,2777,6599_3665_
44771558,00.html

Regardless of the debates over causation, most experts believe that the
growth of prescription drug costs will likely continue to surpass growth in
other components of health care spending. However, the rate of that growth
is expected to decelerate. These projections are largely based on beliefs that
the market share of lower-priced generic drug products will increase, higher
levels of consumer cost sharing will dampen utilization increases, and fewer
new drugs will be introduced. Taken together, these factors will likely slow
the growth in prescription drug spending in future years.4 This deceleration continues a recent trend. In 2003, U.S. prescription drug sales grew
11.5 percent to reach $216.4 billion.5 Though 11.5 percent sales growth is
considered strong, particularly in the 2003 economy, the declining growth
trend is a cause for concern for investors (Table 1).
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The prescription drug industry is highly profitable, although accurately
measuring the industry’s profitability is difficult. Responding to concerns
about the magnitude of the industry’s profit margins, industry representatives contend that standard accounting that measures current revenues relative to current costs does not adequately address the fact that revenues
from drug research investments are not realized for many years. Regardless of measurement, however, it is accurate to say the U.S. prescription
drug industry performs well relative to other U.S. industries.

Top Performers
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Generic products account for less than 10
percent of total sales
for the U.S. prescription drug market but
51 percent of the total
prescriptions filled.

Overall, the U.S. prescription drug market is relatively fragmented. Only
five of the leading companies reported sales revenues in excess of 5 percent of the market. In 2003, the ten top-ranked companies in terms of
sales had a combined market share of 59.6 percent,6 and all of them were
large research-based manufacturers. The top eight rankings did not change
from those of 2002 (Table 2).
Rankings of companies on the basis of prescription volume are a bit
different. Three of the top ten companies—Watson, Mylan, and Teva,
ranked number 3, 4, and 5, respectively—are generic firms. Generic
products account for less than 10 percent of total sales for the U.S. prescription drug market7; however, they account for 51 percent of the total prescriptions filled.8
Major mergers between pharmaceutical companies have occurred at a
rate of about one per year over the last 15 years.9 Pharmaceutical company mergers peaked in the early 1990s with six mergers occurring in
1994.10 Higher research and development costs are a factor cited for the
trend in mergers and acquisitions. In recent years, merger activity in
the industry has involved biotechnology companies. Research manufacturers increasingly turn to biotech companies to fill their research
and development needs, sometimes by buying a biotech firm’s entire
pipeline of products. According to BIO, an association representing
biotech companies, academic institutions, and state biotech centers,
merger and acquisition activity rose 86 percent in 2003 compared with
2002. Despite this merger activity, the prescription drug market remains
fragmented in aggregate.
Although by total sales and prescription volume the market is divided across
many manufacturers, market share within therapeutic classes is a different
matter. A therapeutic class represents a group of drug products that are
similar in terms of chemical structure, clinical indications, pharmacology,
or therapeutic activity.11 Unlike many other product markets, in the prescription drug market there is little ability to shift consumer demand from
one class of products to another. Consumers require a particular type of
therapy and generally cannot substitute a different type of prescription
drug product. In the food market, for example, consumers might be persuaded to buy less bread and eat more beef. But in the prescription drug
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market, antihistamines cannot substitute for antidepressants. For this reason, the competitiveness of the prescription drug market must be considered within the context of therapeutic class. It is also important to note that
even within therapeutic classes, drugs may not be interchangeable. The
true degree of competitiveness within a therapeutic class is highly contingent on the clinical indications for, the pharmacology of, the side effects
related to, and other characteristics of the particular drugs within that class.
Market dominance by a single company within a given therapeutic class is
not uncommon. Patent laws provide a market advantage to manufacturers
of new drugs by precluding competitors from selling that specific product
until the patents expire. As a result, brand name products typically drive
expenditures within therapeutic classes. Although competition can occur
between branded products within a therapeutic class, competitive forces
are perhaps most robust when generic equivalents for a particular branded
product are available.
Cholesterol-lowering drugs were the top-selling therapeutic class in 2003,
with over $13.9 billion in sales.12 The cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor,
with $6.8 billion in sales, has been the best selling prescription drug

TABLE 2
Ten Leading Corporations Ranked by Total U.S. Sales (in billions of dollars)
and U.S. Dispensed Prescriptions (in millions), 2003

Corporation

Total
Sales ($B)

Market
Share (%)

Corporation

Total
Rx’s (M)

Market
Share (%)

1

Pfizer

29.2

13.4

1

Pfizer

377.4

11.0

2

GlaxoSmithKline

18.6

8.5

2

Novartis

230.8

6.7

3

Johnson & Johnson

15.2

7.0

3

Mylan Labs

207.2

6.0

4

Merck & Co.

14.1

6.5

4

Teva

206.4

6.0

5

AstraZeneca

10.4

4.8

5

Watson

164.8

4.8

6

Bristol-Meyers Squibb

9.6

4.4

6

GlaxoSmithKline

159.6

4.6

7

Novartis

9.5

4.4

7

Merck & Co.

126.2

3.7

8

Amgen

7.7

3.6

8

Johnson & Johnson

104.8

3.0

9

Wyeth

7.6

3.5

9

Abbott

96.8

2.8

Lilly

7.5

3.5

10

AstraZeneca

91.8

2.7

10

Source: IMS Health, “Leading 20 Corporations by U.S. Sales, 2003,” available at www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/
0,2777,6599_42720942_44304255,00.html; and IMS Health, “Leading 20 Corporations by Total U.S. Dispensed Prescriptions, 2003,” available at
www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/0,2777,6599_42720951_43989649,00.html.
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every year since 2001.13 Other top-selling drugs include the cholesterol
drug Zocor ($4.4 billion), the heartburn drug Prevacid ($4 billion), the
biotech anemia drug Procrit ($3.3 billion), and the psychotherapeutic drug
Zyprexa ($3.2 billion).14 Lipitor was also the most dispensed product in
2003, with over 69 million filled prescriptions.15 Other leading products
in terms of volume sold include the thyroid medicine Synthroid by Abbott
(49.8 million prescriptions), the blood pressure drug Norvasc by Pfizer
(36.4 million prescriptions), and the antidepressant Zoloft by Pfizer (32.7
million prescriptions).
Financial performance of individual manufacturers varies widely. For
research-based manufacturers, financial performance is tied to the discovery of new products and the marketing of new and existing products.
In contrast, financial performance for generic drug manufacturers is tied
to the rapidity of market penetration and prescription sales volume.
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A handful of innovator
drugs will provide the
majority of a research
manufacturer’s revenues, which must pay
for the investment
costs of both the successful products and
the ones that fail.

Research and Development
Research is a critical element of success for pharmaceutical manufacturers. Research and development (R&D) that results in new products is essential for long-term revenue growth. A handful of innovator (that is,
breakthrough) or branded drugs will provide the majority of a research
manufacturer’s revenues. The revenues from these products must pay
not only for the investment costs of the successful products but for the
ones that fail as well. According to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), only three out of every ten prescription
drugs on the market generate revenues that meet or exceed average research and development costs.
In 2002, PhRMA member companies (including foreign-owned companies) invested $32 billion in drug research and development—a 7.7% increase in R&D investment over 2001. R&D expenditures were 16 percent
of total 2002 sales for these companies.16 According to PhRMA, the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry invests a greater percentage of their sales in research than other American industries, including electronics, communications, and aerospace sectors.17
Discovering and developing new medicines is increasingly expensive and
time-consuming. An increased focus on more complex diseases and the
production of more sophisticated drug delivery systems increases the time
needed for drug research and development. Furthermore, the complexity
of clinical trials affiliated with the therapeutic classes researched extends
the time and cost it takes to bring a product to market.18
According to the industry, it takes 12 to 15 years to discover and develop
a new drug and bring it to market. Industry estimates that the direct cost
of developing a new drug is approximately $403 million (in year 2000
dollars). When capitalized, accounting for lost opportunity costs, the average “cost” of new drug innovation is approximately $802 million (in
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year 2000 dollars).19 If post-approval R&D costs such as the development
of new formulations are included, industry sources argue that the true
costs rise to $897 million (in year 2000 dollars).20
These estimates have been challenged extensively, however. Critics contend that industry estimates of research and development costs are
grossly inflated. Many believe that these costs include activities that are
actually marketing functions and that the estimates do not provide offsets for federal tax credits and other subsidies to support research and
development costs.
Though the industry provides much of the intellectual and financial capital
to develop products and bring them to market, the federal government
also invests in drug development through intellectual property protection, federal support for research and development, and tax subsidies.21
These federal vehicles for supporting drug research and development
are created to ensure patient access to new medical therapies, but they
also are important to the finances of pharmaceutical companies.
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Industry provides
much of the capital,
but the federal government also invests
in drug development
through intellectual
property protection,
support for research,
and tax subsidies.

■ Patents and marketing exclusivity provisions limit competition for a

defined period of time, allowing brand name products to dominate the
market and establish name recognition. The effective patent life for
pharmaceutical products receiving U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval is generally less than the 20 years provided by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office because companies file for patents early in
the development process. Opportunities for patent restoration and other
marketing exclusivities are provided through a variety of federal acts,
including the Hatch-Waxman Act, which provides up to five years of
patent restoration; the Orphan Drug Act, which provides seven years of
marketing exclusivity for products designated as “orphan drugs”22 by
FDA; and the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, which
provides six additional months of marketing exclusivity beyond patents
or other exclusivities for companies performing pediatric studies approved by the FDA. These laws have had an impact on effective patent
life for new drugs. According to one estimate, the effective patent life of
drugs has increased from 8.1 years for drugs approved between 1980 and
1984 to 15.1 years for some drugs approved in the late 1990s.23
■ Federal government support for drug R&D also includes financial

support of biomedical research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
and other research facilities. Federally funded research can result directly
or indirectly in new pharmaceuticals. Much of the federally sponsored
research is “basic” in nature without thought to specific drug therapies;
however, it can lead to biological materials or lab processes that make it
possible for the industry to pursue R&D that is directly relevant to new
pharmaceuticals.24 There are no recent estimates of how much NIH
spends on drug R&D. A study by the former Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) estimated that in 1988 federal agencies
spent about $400 million on preclinical drug discovery, or 14 cents for
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every $1 spent by industry on preclinical R&D. The OTA also found
that federal agencies spent about $200 billion on clinical R& D, or 11
cents for every $1 spent by industry on clinical drug R&D.25
■ Federal tax policy provides subsidies in the form of tax credits for

industry R&D. The Research and Experimentation (R&E) Tax Credit,
created in 1981 to encourage firms to increase R&D expenditures from
year to year, covers all R&D necessary to obtain FDA approval to
market a drug.26 Other tax credits available to the pharmaceutical
industry for R&D include the Orphan Drug tax credit—equal to 50
percent of qualified expenses for human clinical trials of drugs designated as orphan drugs—and the U.S. possessions tax credit, which
provides tax credits to businesses that invest in U.S. possessions, such
as Puerto Rico.27
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The majority of new
drug applications approved by FDA are for
drugs that are modified versions of existing drugs, known as
“me too” drugs.

Research investment by U.S. pharmaceutical firms has climbed steadily
over the last two decades; however, rising R&D spending has not resulted
in increased development of new innovator products. The majority of new
drug applications approved by FDA each year are for drugs that are modified versions of existing approved drugs, commonly referred to as “me
too” or drugs. These types of drugs require less R&D investment and represent less commercial risk than the initial innovators in their therapeutic
class. They also offer little in terms of new clinical benefit over their predecessors. Instead, their benefits can be found in fewer side effects, different
dosage, or different delivery methods (for example, oral, injection, patch,
etc.) than the innovator product. Their differences from the innovator products, however, are enough to qualify them as a new drug and therefore
qualify for patents. As a result, “me too” drugs are often criticized for driving rising prescription drug costs, because they essentially extend patent
protections and limit access of generic drugs to the market.
The annual number of new drugs receiving FDA approval that are considered to be marks of innovation—drugs that are different in structure
from those already on the market, categorized as “new molecular entities” (NME)—is low. In 2002, only 17 were approved, the fewest number
approved by FDA since 1983.28 In 2003, 21 were approved in comparison
to the high of 35 approved in 1999.29 This lack of innovator productivity
raises concerns about the impact of the industry’s R&D investment.
Several factors are believed to contribute to this return on research investment. Advances in basic science have significantly increased research
opportunities. The number of drug targets—disease-specific proteins,
receptors, enzymes and genes—has risen dramatically from 500 to more
than 5000 in recent years, and there has been an expansion in research
to investigate them. R&D might be becoming more expensive because
the “low-hanging fruit” has already been picked and because areas of
unmet medical need are in complex diseases difficult to understand and
control.30 This leads to longer development processes with more complicated clinical trials.
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Changing industry structure may also affect industry productivity. Thirty
years ago, most research affiliated with drug discovery was conducted “in
house.” During the 1980s, the industry became more complex with the
introduction of biotechnology companies. Biotech drugs differ from traditional chemical pharmaceuticals in key ways. Biotech medicines are synthetic versions of natural biologic substances (for example, proteins,
enzymes, and antibodies) and are generally injected or infused directly into
the bloodstream. Only a handful of traditional research-based manufacturers (also known as “Big Pharma”) actually research and develop biotech
drugs. Instead, research manufacturers use agreements with biotech firms
to keep their drug development pipelines robust. These agreements may
be driving up the cost of drug development.
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Over 80 percent of all
promotional spending
can be categorized as
“professional spending,” which includes
journal advertisement,
activities of drug representatives, and free
drug samples.

Contractual agreements and collaborative arrangements between manufacturers and biotech firms have been increasing. In 2003, the pharmaceutical industry struck more than 300 new deals with biotech companies
to manufacture and market biotech’s drug products,31 and 21 new biotech
products received FDA approval, including products for HIV, Alzheimer’s
disease, cancer, psoriasis, and asthma. Sales for biotech drugs also grew
22 percent in 2003, with the global market for biotech drugs exceeding
$30 billion.32 Twenty-five to forty percent of industry sales are reported to
come from drugs that originated in the biotech sector.33
Regardless of the contributing factors, measuring industry productivity
and the ultimate impact of R&D investment is difficult because the “payoff” from such investment takes a long time to materialize. R&D in the
current market contributes to new drug development far into the future.
Therefore, the true impact of increased R&D spending in recent years
may not be realized yet.

Marketing
To help offset revenue losses due to fewer new drug launches and generic
entries, manufacturers try to maximize performance of existing brands.
Product promotion is a critical element of this effort. In 2002, drug manufacturers spent over $19 billion on total product promotion, including
samples, brochures, drug detailing (in other words, sales people marketing drugs directly to doctors in their offices), and direct-to-consumer
advertising (DTC) (Figure 1).34
The bulk of all promotional spending is targeted toward physicians and
other providers. Over 80 percent of all promotional spending can be categorized as “professional spending.” Professional promotional spending
includes costs of journal advertisement, promotion and sales activities of
drug representatives at hospitals and physician offices, and free drug
samples. The retail value of free drug samples provided to physician’s offices reached almost $12 billion in 2002, making it the largest component of
professional promotional spending,35 followed by physician office promotion at over $5 billion. The dollar value of free product sampling grew faster
than any other form of promotion in 2002.36
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Manufacturers are allocating a large portion of marketing resources to physician detailing; however, the traditional detail-based marketing model for
professional promotion is being challenged. Increasingly, physicians use
the Internet for medical information, including continuing medical education initiatives and point-of-care decision tools like electronic prescribing.
Manufacturers are committing greater resources to “e-marketing.” Some
market experts believe that point-of-care e-prescribing and related integrated drug reference tools are on the verge of becoming the most powerful marketing tools. Various estimates have projected that over 50 percent
of physicians will adopt e-prescribing by 2005.37
Although the overwhelming majority of promotional spending is geared
toward providers, DTC spending is a subject of ongoing debate. DTC
was the fastest growing component of all pharmaceutical promotional
expenditures in the late 1990s. From 1996 to 2000, DTC spending—
advertisements in magazines, newspapers, and on television, radio and
the Internet—tripled (Figure 1, inset). Spending on television ads alone
increased sevenfold.

FIGURE 1
Total Promotional Spending (in billions of dollars) in the United States by Type

Professional
Direct-to-Consumer
Total Direct-to-Consumer
Spending
(in billions of dollars)
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

$ Billions
.791
1.069
1.317
1.848
2.467
2.679
2.638
3.325

Source: IMS Health

Source: DTC promotion represents the expenditures for direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising for prescription products on television, in magazines
and newspapers, on radio, and outdoors. Professional promotional spending includes costs for sales activities, including product samples, office- and hospital-based physicians and directors of pharmacies, and advertising expenditures for prescription products appearing in medical journals. IMS Health, “Total
U.S. Promotional Spend by Type, 2003” and “Total U.S. Professional Promotional Spend by Type,” available at www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/
articleC/0,2777,6599_44304752_44889690,00.html.
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Some believe the surge in DTC spending is linked to the relaxing of FDA
rules on mass media advertising for prescription drugs, which occurred
in 1997. However, others point out that the increase in spending started
before 1997 and therefore the new guidelines may not be the sole reason
for the increase.38
DTC advertising is concentrated on a few products in a variety of therapeutic classes. According to IMS Health, the top DTC-promoted brands in
2001 were the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx by Merck & Co ($135 million),
the arthritis drug Celebrex by Pfizer ($130 million), the heartburn medicine Nexium by AstraZeneca ($127 million), the erectile dysfunction therapy
Viagra by Pfizer ($101 million), and the allergy medicine Allegra by Aventis
($90 million). In general, top-selling products have large DTC expenditures,
although the products with the most promotional expenditures do not always correspond to the top-selling products.
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The GAO found that
spending on heavily
advertised drugs increased faster than
other sales and that
this was due to increased utilization,
not increasing prices.

Manufacturers tend to spend the most on consumer ads for drugs used to
treat chronic conditions that require treatment over extended periods of
time such as asthma, depression, allergies, arthritis, and diabetes. Drugs
with low occurrence of mild side effects are also better candidates because
there is less information on risk that needs to be conveyed to the consumer.
DTC advertising for certain types of drugs such as “lifestyle” drugs (for
example, Viagra) is viewed as a good investment because insurance usually does not cover such products, leaving most consumers to pay for them
completely out-of- pocket. Within a specific class of drugs, the intensity of
DTC advertising varies, and the amount of advertising for specific products changes over time.39
Critics argue that DTC advertising drives spending as well as inappropriate utilization and takes money away from R&D. They claim DTC advertising leads consumers to seek drugs when other treatments may be
more appropriate or to seek newer, more expensive drugs that may (or
may not) be as effective as their predecessors.
Supporters argue that DTC advertising educates consumers about treatment options and that increased drug utilization encouraged by DTC has
improved public health.40 Furthermore, they argue that it prompts patients
to seek medical advice about health concerns, resulting in new diagnoses
and additional health care recommendations.
The U.S. General Accounting Office [(GAO), renamed the U.S. Government
Accountability Office in July 2004] concluded in a 2002 study on DTC advertising that it appears to increase prescription drug spending and utilization. The GAO also found that spending on heavily advertised drugs
increased faster than other sales and that this was due to an increase in
utilization, not increasing prices. It also noted, however, that the spur in
utilization may be due to the type of drug that is heavily advertised, namely
the chronic condition drugs. Another fact to consider is that many of the
same drugs promoted through DTC advertising are also promoted to physicians through drug detailing; therefore, determining the true influence
of DTC is difficult.
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Growth of Generic Drugs
Despite the efforts of research-based firms to fend off the advances of
generic products, generic drugs are a growing component of the pharmaceutical industry with a steady increase in share of total prescriptions. When Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act in 1984 (also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act) to
streamline the approval process for generic drugs and increase their
access to the market, generic drugs accounted for only 18 percent of the
prescriptions filled. By 2003, generic products accounted for 51 percent
of all prescriptions filled.41 Between 2002 and 2003 alone, generic sales
grew by 22 percent and the volume of generic prescriptions grew by 9.2
percent.42 These levels represent new highs in both dollars spent on and
prescriptions for generic drugs.
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In 2003, generic
sales grew by 22 percent and the volume
of generic prescriptions grew by 9.2 percent, representing new
highs for the generic
drug market.

Generic drug manufacturers do not have to conduct clinical trials and
prove safety and efficacy the way brand name drug manufacturers do for
a new patented drug. Instead, they have to prove “bioequivalence,” which
in general terms means their product must deliver the same active ingredient in the same dosage and in the same time frame as the innovator or
brand product.43 The cost for proving bioequivalence is about $1 million,
significantly less than the cost to develop a new drug.44
The lower R&D costs of generics allow drug manufacturers to price generics aggressively, usually at about a third of the price of brand name products. This translates into significant savings for consumers and purchasers.
According to the Generic Pharmaceutical Association, the average price
per prescription for a brand name drug is $84.21, whereas the average price
for a generic drug is $30.56.
According to the FDA, brand name firms are involved with the production of approximately 50 percent of generic drugs. Creators of patented
products sometimes manufacture the generic versions, and sometimes
they also use licensing agreements with generic manufacturers for the
production of generic versions of their patented drugs. Some of these
agreements have been criticized as financial arrangements intended only
to delay the production and distribution of generic substitutes.
Patent expirations for brand name drugs are one of the driving forces behind rising generic drug sales. The expiration of patents for top-selling brand
name drugs creates market opportunities for generic drugs. In year 2005
alone, several major branded drugs that collectively represent over $13 billion in sales (in year 2003 dollars) will lose patent protection (Table 3).
Pravachol and Zocor are top-selling cholesterol medications, and Zoloft is
a leader in the antidepressant category. The loss of patent protection for
these products will likely a have major impact on the overall expenditures
in these therapeutic classes.
Payer cost-containment trends are another driving force behind the
growing market share of generics. Generic substitution requirements in
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TABLE 3
Patent Expiration Dates for Five Top-Selling Prescription Drugs
(in billions of dollars)
2003
Sales ($B)

Date

Prevacid (TAP Pharmaceuticals)

4.0

July 2005

Pravachol (Bristol Myers Squibb)

2.0

October 2005

Zocor (Merck & Co.)

4.4

December 2005

Zoloft (Pfizer)

2.9

December 2005

Drug Name (Manufacturer)

Source: Sales data from IMS Health, “Leading 20 Products by U.S. Sales, 2003,” available at
www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/0,2777,6599_42720942_44304277,00.html; patent expiration dates from the Generic Pharmaceutical Association, “Drug Patent Expiration List 2002 - 2006,” available at www.medvantx.com/550.asp?nav=500.

Medicaid programs and multitiered copays in private health plans effectively reduce cost while helping to accelerate the conversion from brand
name to generic products. Years ago, it would take over six months for a
generic product to capture 50 percent of the dispensed market; in the
current market, it can happen in as little as six to eight weeks.45
Though generic drugs are gaining ground in the U.S. pharmaceutical
market, barriers to entry remain. Patent extensions, restorations, and
periods of market exclusivity granted to brand name manufacturers can
delay when generics are able to enter the market. Patent challenges by
brand name manufacturers also impose legal fees, delaying generic approvals and thus market entry. Product management strategies by brand
name manufacturers, such as product oversampling to physicians, aggressive DTC marketing, and other strategies, can delay market
penetration and affect the rate of conversion from brand name to generic. For example, ulcer medications and antidepressant drugs, the
second- and third-ranked therapeutic classes by U.S. prescription sales
for 2002, maintained their sales rankings in 2003 even though both classes
have generic substitutes available and there is an over-the-counter
ulcer medication available.
The MMA contains provisions to close unintentional loopholes in the
Hatch-Waxman law that delayed the marketing of generic drugs. Among
its provisions, MMA allows brand name manufacturers filing patent infringement litigation against generic drug manufacturers only one 30month stay of marketing exclusivity. Previously allowed were multiple
stays, which could be overlapping and consecutive and could delay generic drug market entry for years. The limitation imposed in the new law
is contentious and will continue to generate policy discussion.
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Access to the lucrative biotech market is currently not available to generic manufacturers. When the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed in 1984,
the biotech industry was in its beginning stages and none of its drugs had
been approved yet. As a result, Hatch-Waxman provides no guidance to
the FDA regarding approval for generic versions of biotech products.
Unlike chemical medicines, biologics cannot be tested for bioequivalency;
new tests must be developed to determine whether a generic version of a
brand name biologic offers the same therapeutic effect.
Biotech drugs are among the most expensive drugs to develop and are
priced accordingly. As patent expirations for the initial products of the
25-year-old biotech industry approach [reportedly 17 biotech drugs worth
more than $10 billion in sales (in year 2000 dollars) will lose patent protection in 2006], the industry, Congress, and the FDA are beginning to
debate whether generic biologics should be allowed and what the approval process should require.
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The research-based pharmaceutical industry argues that making biologics
is still so complex that generic firms should have to prove safety and
effectiveness as if they were creating a new medicine. The FDA is in the
process of putting together scientific guidelines on how to prove that copies of biologics are similar to the original medicines, but it has cautioned
in the past that there are significant scientific issues about how to show
“sameness” to assure the agency that generics are safe, pure, and potent,
as well as equivalent to the brand.

A Complicated Marketplace
The marketplace that links consumers to manufacturers is highly complex
and involves a number of intermediaries. The “sell” side of the prescription drug transaction includes manufacturers who produce the product, as
well as wholesalers and retail distributors who buy the product and resell
it to the consumer. On the “buy” side of the transaction, the consumer is
actually an amalgamation of multiple parties including (a) the patient who
will use the product and will likely pay for at least a portion of the purchase price, (b) the physician, or other health care provider, who prescribes
the drug, and (c) the insurer (if the patient has prescription drug coverage)
who shares the financial burden of the purchase with the consumer, may
negotiate prices with retailers and the manufacturer, and can play a role in
limiting or shaping product options.
Individuals — According to surveys by the Kaiser Family Foundation46
over half (54 percent) of Americans say they take prescription drugs on a
regular basis, and one-fourth (24 percent) say they take three or more
drugs regularly. Thirty percent say they currently have more than five
prescription drugs in their medicine cabinet.
Unlike most consumer products, users of prescription drugs have limited
choice in selecting a particular product. Purchases must be initiated by
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physicians or other appropriate health care providers via prescription of a
particular drug. Patients generally lack the clinical expertise necessary to
influence providers’ prescribing choices, although the aim of DTC advertising is clearly to motivate patients in this regard. Despite the increase in
DTC advertising, most manufacturer marketing focuses on physicians in
recognition of the role they play in product selection.
Insurers — Insurance coverage also directly affects access to prescription
drugs. The Kaiser survey found that 25 percent of respondents did not
have prescription drug coverage, and 29 percent said they have not filled
a prescription because of the cost. Insurers can also influence the types of
drugs used by an individual. In general, consumers with drug insurance
use more prescriptions, including more brand name drugs, and have
greater prescription expense than people without insurance. A driving
force of this dichotomy is the price insulation that third party coverage
provides—particularly for higher-priced brand name drugs. Faced with
a flat copayment instead of a retail price, people with drug insurance are
less sensitive to price differentials between drug products.
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Third party payment (public and private) continues to steadily offset the
consumer’s out-of-pocket share of drug spending. In 1994, out-of-pocket
and third party shares of total drug expenditures were nearly equal. By
2002, the consumer out-of-pocket share was down to 30 percent.47 The
rise in third party payment over the years is due to an expanding share of
total expenditures paid by private insurers, which reflects an expansion
in drug coverage. In 2002, private third party payers paid $77.6 billion
for prescription drugs.48
Out-of-pocket spending for prescription drugs, however, is growing at a
faster rate than private health insurance spending.49 A driving factor for
this trend is the cost-containment measures imposed by third party payers,
most notably managed care plans and their pharmacy benefit managers
(PBMs).50 PBMs are private firms that manage drug benefit programs for
employers, insurers, and managed care plans. PBMs perform a variety of
functions, including formulary design and management, pharmacy network and payment administration, mail order, rebate negotiations or management, and patient compliance programs.
Prescription drug formularies were introduced by health plans to influence prescribing patterns with the goal of reducing costs. Drugs on the
formulary are covered, whereas nonformulary drugs are not. In recent
years, fairly inclusive formularies with multitiered copayment levels have
become the general rule in the administration of drug coverage. Such
formularies create lower copayments for generic drugs and feature less
expensive or more effective brand name products on a preferred drug list
(PDL). Manufacturers are often willing to offer discounted prices in
exchange for the guaranteed market share likely to result from inclusion
in the PDL. The different copayment levels create incentives for beneficiaries to use generic or low-cost brand name drugs. This approach
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provides coverage for a broad range of drugs, but shifts more of the expense for certain products (such as high-cost brand name drugs) to consumers. For most consumers, these copays and formularies affect them
when they present their prescription to a pharmacist at a retail pharmacy.
Retailers — According to the National Association of Chain Drug Stores,
there are over 35, 000 chain drug store pharmacies (for example, CVS),
mass merchandiser pharmacies (such as Target), and supermarket
pharmacies nationwide. In addition, there are over 20,000 independent
pharmacies that are small, privately owned individual pharmacies or small
chain pharmacies.
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In recent years, the distribution market has shifted away from independent, privately owned pharmacies toward chain drug stores, food stores,
and mass merchandisers. These retail pharmacies dominate the distribution market, dispensing approximately 60 percent of all prescription drugs
in the United States.51
Mail order service is a fast-growing segment of the distribution market.
Mail order sales grew by 15.5 percent in 2003, resulting in a 13.2 percent
market share.52 Lower copayments for mail order services offered by
managed care organizations and PBMs are a driving force behind the
growth in mail order purchases.
The Internet has expanded consumer access to prescription drugs.
“Internet pharmacies” mimic traditional retail pharmacies in terms of
products and services and compete directly with them; they dispense a
similar line or range of drugs to consumers and may offer patient education and/or drug interaction screenings. There also are Internet “prescription sites” that offer access to a limited selection of drugs. Lifestyle drugs
are promoted this way. Prescription order writing and filling services are
provided at these sites. Finally, traditional retail pharmacies provide
Internet sites as an option for consumers to place their refill and prescription orders.
Internet access to prescription drugs appears to provide convenience and
easy availability; however, such pharmacy outlets raise significant safety
concerns, regarding, in particular, patient education and safeguards, the
monitoring of prescription writing, and the quality of the drugs themselves.53 Internet pharmacies have already been implicated in scandals
involving counterfeit and contaminated drugs.
Wholesalers — The majority of pharmaceutical drugs sold in the United
States are purchased through drug wholesalers. Wholesalers provide a
cost effective means for manufacturers and retailers to purchase, deliver,
and sell prescription drugs. Serving as a middleman, wholesalers help
lower manufacturers’ costs through large volume purchases while providing “one-stop shopping” for retailers, thus eliminating the need to
negotiate contracts with individual manufacturers.
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Wholesalers generate revenue from both manufacturers and retailers. Retailers pay fees for distribution services, and manufacturers provide cash
rebates and discounts for prompt or early payment. Wholesalers operate
on narrow profit margins; the wholesale markup is modest, usually just a
few cents for every dollar of prescription drugs sold. The average wholesale price (AWP) is intended to represent the average price at which wholesalers sell drugs to physicians, pharmacies, and other customers.
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These “sticker prices” or “list prices” are commercially published and
sold to public and private purchasers. They serve as a reference price
for purchasers, with payments usually corresponding to AWP, less a
specified percentage (for example, AWP minus 15 percent). AWP, however, is not an accurate reflection of actual market prices because it does
not include discounts available to various purchasers. It is generally
considered to be an overstated price and is facetiously referred to as
“ain’t what’s paid.”54
The recently enacted MMA addressed the problem of AWP by replacing
it with the average sales price (ASP) as the basis for prescription drug
reimbursement under Medicare Part B. The ASP is the average of a drug’s
final sales prices in the United States, net of rebates or other discounts.
The new payment basis will be implemented in 2005.
The wholesale industry is highly concentrated, with 90 percent of all sales
made by only three companies. The “Big Three” are McKesson HBOC,
Inc; Cardinal Health, Inc.; and AmeriSource Corp. As the principal pipeline of drug distribution, these large wholesalers purchase a full line of
pharmaceutical products from manufacturers and resell them to retailers. In some cases, the products are warehoused by the large wholesaler
then resold and distributed directly to retailers. In other cases, these wholesalers provide “brokerage services,” which can include delivery directly
from the manufacturers without warehousing as well as allowing retailers and manufacturers to submit orders and payments through the wholesaler without involving the wholesaler in the delivery of the purchase.55
Regional wholesalers deal with a smaller volume of drugs than the Big
Three, but they sell to the same purchasers and compete with the large
wholesalers. Small wholesalers vary in their size, product lines, and services. Some provide a full line of drug products, others provide only certain products such as injectables, and yet others team with medical supply
companies to provide combination products of drugs and medical devices.
There also are secondary wholesalers who specialize in the purchasing
and selling of select discounted pharmaceutical products to other wholesalers. The sources for these discounted products can be manufacturers
offering sales to clear their inventory or meet sales quarter goals, and
pharmacies and other wholesalers with overstocks. A distinguishing
feature of secondary wholesalers is their willingness to risk capital by
buying discounted products for quick resale. Secondary wholesalers compete entirely on price. Purchasing prescription drugs from secondary
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wholesalers is attractive to large and regional wholesalers because their
discounted prices can undercut the regular contract price offered by the
manufacturer. As a result, large and regional wholesalers may reduce
contract purchases with manufacturers for certain drugs so they can take
advantage of the secondary market sales.
The secondary wholesale market generates concerns regarding product
safety, integrity, and pricing practices. There is no formal definition or
count of secondary wholesalers, and regulation of the entire wholesale
industry varies from state to state. Corrupt secondary wholesalers have
been the root of several large counterfeit drug cases (for example, fake
Lipitor) and “drug diversion” schemes—a sales practice that sends lowercost drugs intended for institutional settings to retail settings—to make a
profit. States have responded by tightening licensing requirements for
wholesale businesses, and FDA is pursuing product packaging and tracking changes to ensure product safety.
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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
As might be expected for such an unwieldy segment of the U.S. economy,
the federal government is a unique stakeholder in the pharmaceutical
marketplace. It plays three distinct roles; as regulator, researcher, and
purchaser, the government is an influential participant in the industry.

Regulation
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most regulated industries in
the United States, and the FDA is the federal agency responsible for overseeing the pharmaceutical industry.
FDA oversight of new prescription drugs can be classified into preapproval
and postapproval activities. Preapproval activities focus on ensuring that
a drug is safe and effective before it is marketed to consumers.
Postapproval activities include postmarketing surveillance to ensure the
ongoing safety of marketed drugs, the enforcement of good manufacturing practices so that drugs are manufactured in a consistent and controlled
manner, and the monitoring of prescription drug advertising to ensure
the truthful presentation of information regarding effectiveness, side effects, and so forth.
FDA is also responsible for overseeing the generic and over-the-counter
(OTC) drug development, as well as marketing.
New Drugs — Regulatory authority for the agency is provided in the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), which was passed in 1938.
United States drug law has evolved dramatically since then, with the
most significant change occurring with the Kefauver-Harris Drug
Amendments of 1962. The Amendments fundamentally restructured the
way in which FDA regulated new medicines, transforming a system of
premarket notification into one that requires individual premarket approval
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of the safety and effectiveness of every new drug.56 Some believe that with
passage of this legislation the regulation of drugs became the single most
controversial (and perhaps the most important) of FDA’s activities.57
According to the FDA, no drug is absolutely “safe,” and therefore the
agency follows a “risk-based approach” for new drug approval. When a
proposed drug’s benefits outweigh its known risks, the FDA considers
the drug safe enough to approve.58
In general, the new drug development process starts with the discovery
of NMEs, which are compounds that have not been previously approved
by the FDA. Preclinical testing is performed on animals to determine safety
and biological activity. The drug’s sponsor, usually the manufacturer,
eventually pursues an investigational new drug (IND) application from
the FDA, which allows the sponsor to conduct human studies.
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Controlled clinical trials (that is, human studies) are designed to assess
the safety and efficacy of a drug for its proposed use. Clinical trials provide the only legal basis for demonstrating a drug’s effectiveness.59 Clinical trials are conducted in a three-phase process. Each phase requires larger
patient populations and greater scrutiny of the drug’s performance.
Phase I clinical trials typically involve healthy subjects and are designed
to test a compound for metabolic properties, safety, and tolerance. Phase
II trials involve selected populations with the disease or condition to be
treated, diagnosed, or prevented and are designed to obtain information on safety and initial data on efficacy. Phase III trials are large-scale
trials involving subjects with the target disease or condition and are
designed to gather data on efficacy, safety, and drug-related adverse
effects. Throughout the process, many potential new therapies fall by
the wayside: Approximately 70 percent of drugs entering clinical trials
complete Phase I, 33 percent complete Phase II, and 27 percent
complete phase III.60
Once clinical testing is completed, the drug’s sponsor submits a
New Drug Application (NDA), which is the basis for FDA approval.
The NDA tells the drug’s whole story, including what happened during
clinical trials, what is included in its components and constitution,
how the drug performed in animal studies, how the drug behaves in
the human body, and lastly how it would be manufactured, processed,
and packaged.61
New drugs typically qualify for 20 years of patent protection. This protection precludes competitors from marketing products with the same
active ingredients. The “clock” for patents begins with the submission of
the IND. Therefore, clinical testing and FDA review and approval time
can consume a large portion of a drug’s patent life, although some of this
lost protection can be restored.
The amount of time it takes the FDA to review a new drug application
has been reduced. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) of 1992
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provided the FDA with a series of fees (for example, application fees, establishment fees, product fees, etc.) to hire additional staff to help quicken
the NDA review process. As a result of the PDUFA and its reauthorizations
in 1997 and 2002, the FDA is currently reviewing more than 90 percent of
priority drug applications in 6 months or less and standard drug applications in 12 months or less.62 Before the passage of the PDUFA, NDA review
took upward of 18 months.63 According to PhRMA, this reduction in review time largely eliminated the lag time to approval that had existed between the United States and other industrialized countries.
The FDA has “fast track” policies and procedures in place to help qualified
applicants navigate the NDA submission and review process. FDA staff
work closely with applicants throughout the process to reduce potential
delays in application submission and review. Products eligible for fast track
designation address an unmet medical need.
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The FDA has taken additional steps to make urgently needed drugs—
namely drugs promising significant benefit over existing therapy to treat
serious or life-threatening diseases—available sooner. Under the “accelerated approval “ rule, FDA is allowed to approve a drug on the basis of
a “surrogate endpoint,” which is a positive effect on a marker of the disease rather than an actual positive effect on survival of an illness.64
FDA also allows broader use of investigational drugs prior to market approval. “Treatment INDs” and the “parallel track mechanism” for AIDS
and HIV-related drugs allow promising drugs not yet approved to be
used in expanded access protocols. This means individuals not qualifying to participate in the controlled clinical trials may be able to enroll in
special protocols that allow them access to the drugs and provide manufacturers with additional information.
Generic Drugs — Regulation of generic drugs was dramatically reformed
with a complex law called The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act.
This law amended the FD&C Act and various federal statutes that govern
U.S. patents. It basically established the framework for the approval of generic drugs and their entry into the marketplace.
The Hatch-Waxman Act permits generic manufacturers to use and reference the safety and effectiveness research conducted by the brand name
company when seeking FDA approval to market a copy of a brand name
drug. Before 1984, generic manufacturers were required to duplicate this
research. The law requires generic manufacturers to prove that their copies
of the brand drugs they seek to market are chemically and biologically
equivalent to the original drug. Generic manufacturers are permitted to
begin testing of their drugs before the patent on the innovator drug expires, and brand name manufacturers must share relevant data with
generic companies so such tests can be performed.
Under this law, the first generic company to file an abbreviated new drug
application (ANDA) with the FDA for a copy of a patented drug gets 180
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days of “exclusivity,” meaning no other generic copy of that drug can
come to market in that period. Finally, generic companies are required to
“certify” to the FDA how their products will or will not infringe all existing patents on the drug they seek to copy.
The Hatch-Waxman Act also provides a vehicle for brand name companies to “restore” some of their product’s patent life lost during the testing
and approval process. The maximum restored patent life is five years,
and the maximum total effective patent life—meaning the time between
FDA approval and a drug’s patent expiration after any restored patent
life—cannot exceed 14 years. This lengthens a brand name drug’s protection from generic competition. The law also permits periods of “market
exclusivity” for brand name products for new uses of a drug and for new
active ingredients that have not been previously marketed.
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Over-the-Counter Drugs — The FDA has a separate process for approving over-the-counter (OTC) products. Instead of reviewing and approving
thousands of individual products, the FDA evaluates the active ingredients found in them. The FDA then publishes standards for specific OTC
treatment categories (for example, antacids, laxatives, etc.). An OTC drug
product does not need specific approval before marketing as long as the
product meets its category standards.65
Sometimes an approved prescription drug is deemed appropriate by FDA
for self-use and the drug’s status is switched to OTC. To take this action,
the FDA would determine that the drug treats a condition consumers can
diagnose and manage themselves and, therefore, that the drug is sufficiently safe for use without prescriber supervision. The drug’s label must
also explain potential adverse effects and conditions with clear direction.
Status switching from prescription to OTC is usually prompted by the
drug manufacturer; however, other parties can petition FDA for OTC
switches as well. This was the case with the top-selling allergy medicine
Claritin. An insurance company initiated the process for an OTC switch
for Claritin. Its motivation to pursue the switch was the savings that would
result from the removal of Claritin from their formulary once it became
available over the counter. The manufacturer, Schering-Plough, initially
fought the petition because Claritin had a few years left on its patent.
Shortly before Claritin’s patent expired, however, the manufacturer petitioned FDA for the OTC switch itself, which was granted. By getting an
OTC version of Claritin on the market, the manufacturer was able to get
a jump on the generic competition.

Research
The federal government is the largest supporter of academic-based research
in life and health sciences66 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the
principal federal agency that funds and conducts biomedical research,
including research on drugs.67 In fiscal year 2003, the NIH’s budget was
over $27 billion.68
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Technology transfer is basically the “sharing and dissemination of scientific knowledge between researchers and research organizations and those
who make practical use of the information including physicians, health
care providers, and industry.”69 According to the GAO, “much of the pharmaceutical related technology transfer between the public and private
sector originates with research conducted by or funded by the NIH.”70
The transfer of technology from government-based medical research laboratories to the private sector is an effort to have new pharmaceuticals
brought to market more efficiently than would be possible for the federal
agency acting alone.
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In general, government and academic scientists conduct basic research
identifying compounds, methods, and chemical reactions that may be of
value in treating disease. Both the NIH and academic institutions conduct preclinical and clinical testing (that is, Phase I and Phase II clinical
trials). In general, industry conducts the Phase III clinical trials and pursues approval for marketing.
Public-Private Partnerships — The key component of successful publicprivate technology transfer is the incentive to develop and commercialize government-owned research or inventions. Historically, the government generally retained the title to any inventions created under federal research grants and contracts. In 1980, however, Congress enacted
two laws focusing on encouraging the commercialization of governmentdeveloped and -funded technologies:
■ The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act addressed

government-owned technology. It declared that inventions owned by
the government remained the property of the agencies that developed
them. It also established guidelines for the licensing of governmentproduced technologies to U.S. businesses.
■ The Bayh-Dole Act addressed technology developed by federal

contractors and grantees. It authorized federal agencies to provide
license agreements with private entities to develop federally owned
inventions. The agencies could collect royalties for such licenses.
Under the Act, businesses could profit from inventions or products
developed from federally funded research.
The ultimate goal of these laws was the public benefit from federally conducted research. NIH’s goals in the technology transfer process emphasize public benefits over financial consideration.71 However, the financial
success of certain drugs that benefited from government-funded research
has raised concerns about whether the federal government is getting a
fair return on its investment.
The GAO recently examined the public-private technology transfer process involving the cancer drug Taxol as a case study in federal technology
transfer policies. The GAO determined that NIH’s total investment in
Taxol-related research reached $484 million and that five of the six studies submitted to FDA by Taxol manufacturer Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS)
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in support of its marketing approval were either conducted or funded by
NIH. Furthermore, the federal government (via, for example, Medicare)
has been a major purchaser of Taxol, paying over $687 million from 1994
to 1999. The GAO found that NIH only received $35 million in royalty
payments from BMS.
In comparison, the GAO determined that BMS invested approximately $1
billion in its efforts to bring Taxol to market and that worldwide sales for
Taxol totaled over $9 billion from 1993 to 2002. The GAO concluded that
the NIH had invested heavily in research related to Taxol but that NIH’s
financial benefits—$35 million through 2002—from the collaboration with
BMS have not been significant in comparison to the drug’s revenue.
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A related concern is the inherent conflict of interest that can accompany
public-private collaborations. Balancing the need to maintain the integrity of the distribution of public funds with the need to encourage
successful public-private collaboration can be a challenge. The NIH’s conflict-of-interest policies with respect to consulting practices of government officials in the private sector have come under scrutiny. The policies
in place until now have allowed some NIH officials to earn large sums of
money outside their government duties by consulting with private industries. In addition, the rules did not uniformly require full disclosure
of the outside arrangements.
The NIH announced in August 2004 that a new oversight system will
prohibit NIH employees with grantmaking powers from consulting for
pharmaceutical or biotech companies. NIH indicates that other scientists
will be allowed to consult because of the potential to speed the translation of research to cures; however, such consulting will be limited.

Purchasing
The passage of the MMA greatly expanded the government’s role as a purchaser of prescription drugs. Providing a prescription drug benefit to 40
million Medicare beneficiaries, the MMA represents the most significant
change to the entitlement program’s benefit structure since its enactment
in 1965. It will have a significant impact on the pharmaceutical market as
well, particularly with respect to drug access, prices, and sales volume for
the aged population—the industry’s largest consumer group. Once the law
is fully implemented, Medicare will become the largest purchaser of prescription drugs, although that purchasing power will be decentralized
through private prescription drug and managed care plans.
Even before MMA, however, the government played a substantial role in
purchasing prescription drugs. Federal and state governments have long
been providers of prescription drugs to various programs and populations, but their role as purchaser is complicated. Industry representatives
warn that too much consolidation of government purchasing power would
amount to price setting, which would negatively affect R&D efforts and
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the rate of development of new products. Policymakers try to provide
cost-effective access to prescription drugs for their populations in need
without setting prices. As a result, a variety of drug purchasing programs,
each different in design and administration, exist under the umbrella of
government purchasing.
Medicaid, Medicare Part B, the Veterans Administration (VA), and the
Public Health Service (PHS) each have different approaches toward purchasing prescription drugs. Though each secures prescription drugs at a
discount, the size of the discounts and the methodologies for determining and securing the discounted prices differ. Further complicating the
situation is that participation in certain programs is conditional on participation in others. This results in a complicated network of pricing and
discount requirements for manufacturers wanting to sell their products
to federal programs.
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Medicaid — The Medicaid program is currently the largest single purchaser of prescription drugs, accounting for 17 percent of national prescription drug expenditures in 200272; in that same year, Medicaid spending
reached $250 billion and served over 50 million beneficiaries, including
more than 6 million low-income Medicare beneficiaries (that is, dual eligibles).73 Medicaid drug expenditures exceeded $23 billion in 2002, with
$13.4 billion—approximately 58 percent of total drug expenditures—spent
on dual eligibles.74
The Medicaid Prescription Drug Rebate program was created in 1990 out
of concern for the costs Medicaid was paying for outpatient prescription
drugs. Though the rebates help state Medicaid programs receive discounts
similar to what is provided in the nonfederal market, states are seeking
new ways to contain their growing prescription drug costs. Medicaid drug
spending has increased by more than 18 percent per year since 1997.75
The Medicaid drug rebate program requires manufacturers to enter into
agreements to provide states with rebates in order for their prescription
drug products to be covered by Medicaid. The rebate formula is based on
two industry-reported prices: the average manufacturer price (AMP) and
the manufacturer’s best price as paid by pharmacies in the retail trade and
large private sector entities (that is, nonfederal purchasers. The rebate
amount a manufacturer must pay for brand name drugs is the greater of
15.1 percent of the AMP or the difference between the AMP and the best
price offered by the manufacturer to nonfederal purchasers. For generic
drugs, manufacturers must provide 11 percent of the AMP rebate.
The accuracy of a manufacturer’s reported pricing data directly affects
the rebate amount owed. There is no uniform formula or definition of
markets to be used for calculating AMP. As a result, different manufacturers include different markets in their AMP calculations, and the AMP
can be undervalued, which lowers a manufacturer’s rebate liability.
AMP data is self-reported and considered proprietary, so the government
generally does not audit manufacturers.
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“Best price” determinations can be misrepresented as well. Certain discounts and fees (for example, partnership fees) paid by manufacturers to
various purchasers as part of purchasing negotiations are not included in
the definition of best price, yet they directly lower the price paid by some
purchasers. By excluding these discounts and fees from the best price
calculation, any drug’s best price can be inflated, which also results in
lower rebate liability.
To help contain cost increases for Medicaid drugs, states have implemented a variety of policies aimed at limiting use of certain medications. These policies target expensive or risky medications and include
the use of PDLs, prior authorization, increased cost sharing, limits on
prescriptions, and “fail first” requirements (in which alternative, inexpensive drugs must be tried before an expensive one).76 States are also
implementing disease management programs to improve the effectiveness of treatment and care. The goal of these state cost-containment efforts is to reduce costs without reducing appropriate care.77 However,
such policies can have powerful effects on high-volume prescription
drug users. Some of these cost-containment efforts may lose their appeal with the full implementation of the new Medicare outpatient prescription drug benefit when Medicare takes over the provision of such
drugs to dually eligible beneficiaries.
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Medicare Part B — Medicare Part B covers approximately 450 drugs
and biologicals. Part B–covered drugs are purchased by physicians and
other providers and are typically provided in an outpatient setting, such
as a dialysis center or doctor’s office. Part B–covered drugs include non–
self-administered drugs furnished “incident to” a physician’s services,
self-administered oral cancer and antinausea drugs, immunosuppressive drugs, and certain vaccines. In 2002, Medicare spent more than $8.4
billion78 on outpatient drugs,79 with most of that cost attributed to 35
drugs, primarily cancer, inhalation therapy, and oral immunosuppressive medications.80
Payment for Part B drugs has undergone several changes and has been
scrutinized for years. Medicare Part B drugs have been reimbursed based
on the following models: the physician’s acquisition cost, 100 percent of
AWP, the lower of the estimated acquisition costs or 95 percent of AWP, 95
percent of AWP, and 85 percent of AWP. The underlying problem with Part
B reimbursement is that it has been found to exceed the actual prices at
which providers are able to acquire the drugs, resulting in overpayment.
In an effort to address the overpayment issue, MMA established a new
payment system based on manufacturer’s ASP. Manufacturers are required
to report their drugs’ ASPs to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) on a quarterly basis. This is to ensure that reimbursement
reflects market prices. The switch to payment based on ASP is expected
to bring reimbursement in line with Medicare provider acquisition costs
for drugs and biologics covered under Part B. Payment for Part B drugs

26

NHPF Background Paper

has been highly controversial, however, and continuing debate surrounding these policies is likely.
VA — The VA purchases drugs based on actual prices paid by private
purchasers. The VA negotiates directly with drug manufacturers to garner the discount prices available through the Federal Supply Schedule
(FSS). The FSS is a catalogue of a broad range of products and prices
available to federal government purchasers [for example, the VA and the
Department of Defense (DoD)]. The FSS for pharmaceuticals contains over
23,000 products, including brand name and generic products, and is maintained by the VA. The VA purchases over 70 percent of the government’s
total prescription drug purchases from the FSS.
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The amount of the discount depends on how successful the VA is in negotiating the price, but the goal is to obtain a discount equal to the largest
discount given to most-favored nonfederal customers. Many FSS prices
are as much as 50 percent below the nonfederal AMP.
There is a federal ceiling price that applies to roughly one-quarter of the
schedule’s drugs. However, these drugs represent approximately 75 percent of the dollars spent. The ceiling price, equal to 76 percent of the
nonfederal AMP, can be accessed only by the VA, DoD, the Indian Health
Service, and the Coast Guard.
The VA also uses competitive bidding to obtain favorable prices for certain
drugs. Through competitive bidding, the VA can obtain national contracts
for selected drugs that are priced lower than the FSS prices. In 2000, the VA
contract prices averaged 33 percent less than corresponding FSS prices.81
Drug companies voluntarily participate in the FSS for several reasons.
One is that participation in FSS is required in order to participate in Medicaid, which is a much larger percent of total U.S. sales. Another reason is
that many physicians receive at least part of their medical training at VA
hospitals, and the manufacturers have every incentive to have their drugs
available to physicians in training who will theoretically continue to prescribe the same drugs when they leave the VA system. Finally, the percentage of U.S. sales subject to the discount is relatively small. Because
the FSS was not designed for use by retail pharmacies, there is a clear
delineation between retail pricing strategies and FSS pricing for manufacturers, such that providing FSS discounts will have a relatively small
impact on other areas of business.
PHS Entities — Section 340 B of the Public Health Service Act establishes an up-front price break on prescription drugs for safety net providers who are not covered by the Medicaid drug rebate program or the
federal ceiling price provisions under FSS. Organizations qualified to
purchase at the discounts include Community Health Centers, Ryan
White grantees, and ADAPs (AIDS Drug Assistance Programs). Manufacturers wanting to sell their products to these safety net providers must
sign federal agreements to provide drugs at a discount, which is linked to
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the rebate provided to the Medicaid program. Under the agreement, drug
prices for 340 B entities cannot exceed a ceiling price that is defined in
statute as AMP, less the Medicaid rebate percentage. Usually, the prices
are in line with what Medicaid ultimately pays. Manufacturers wanting
to participate in other federal programs such as Medicaid must sign 340
B federal agreements to provide drugs to these safety net providers at the
340 B prices.
Although manufacturers that want to sell drugs to the government under this program are required to sell them at a defined discount, 340 B
entities are not required to purchase their drugs at that price. Some entities choose not to participate in the purchasing program because they
believe they can negotiate better prices on their own. To simplify the process for obtaining 340 B drugs, the Health Resource and Services Agency
(HRSA) has established a prime vendor program in which a single “preferred” wholesaler, AmerisourceBergen, supplies prescription drugs to
covered entities at or below 340 B prices.
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NEW CHALLENGES
The prescription drug market is changing. In addition to drug costs that
continue to climb, new challenges on the horizon affect stakeholders individually and the market collectively. The government’s role in the market is changing as well, as policymakers continue to take steps to combat
growing drug costs, provide cost-efficient access, encourage new drug
development, and ensure safety.
The implementation of the new Medicare drug benefit will impact drug
access, prices, and prescription volume for the industry’s largest consumer
group, and it will also create new dynamics in the government’s role. The
federal government will continue to rely on the retail market to determine prices; however, in an effort to minimize market disruption, there
will be no set price ceilings or formulas as there are in other federal purchasing programs to contain costs.
A dynamic shift between state and federal governments will occur, and
Medicare beneficiaries also eligible for Medicaid will now receive drug
benefits through Medicare (instead of Medicaid). However, MMA’s
“clawback” provisions require states to continue financing much of the cost
of prescription drug coverage for the Medicaid population. States are concerned that they will remain financially at risk for drug costs but will not
have direct control in how the prescription drug benefit is managed, giving them little ability to contain cost or influence quality of care.
It is also unclear whether the significantly increased federal role in financing prescription drugs will influence the other ways in which the
federal government interacts with the prescription drug market. The
ongoing debate related to the importation of prescription drugs suggests
that regulatory and research policies may be shaped, in part, by financial
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concerns. Although policy discussions related to importation preceded
the enactment of the Medicare drug benefit, many feel that the
government’s newly expanded financial stake in prescription drugs has
helped to provide political traction for this issue. Similarly, many policy
analysts are beginning to question whether FDA should consider costeffectiveness in its approval process. Such a policy would be extremely
controversial, and it remains to be seen whether Medicare financial pressures will have an impact on such debates.
These and other challenges will continue to generate much discussion in
and out of Washington as the prescription drug marketplace, its various
stakeholders, and the government evolve to meet their individual needs
and maximize their positions within this very profitable and important
sector of the U.S. economy.
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APPENDIX 1: Glossary
Accelerated Approval: A process used by FDA to speed approval of drugs
promising significant benefit over existing therapy for serious or lifethreatening illnesses.
Bioequivalence: Scientific basis on which generic and name brand drugs are
compared. To be considered bioequivalent, the rate and extent to which the
drugs are absorbed or otherwise available to the treatment site in the body
cannot be significantly different.
Clinical Trials: Human studies designed to distinguish a drug’s effect from
other influences. Clinical trials conducted in the United States must be under
an approved IND and in accord with FDA rules on human studies and informed consent of participants.
IND: Investigational New Drug application. Drug sponsors must submit an
IND application to the FDA before beginning tests of a new drug on humans.
New Molecular Entity (NME): A compound that can be patented which has
not been previously approved by FDA.
Parallel Track Mechanism: FDA policy that makes promising investigational
drugs for AIDS and other HIV-related diseases available under special protocols while the controlled clinical trials for the drugs are being conducted. This
mechanism is designed to make the drugs more widely available to patients
who have no therapeutic alternatives and cannot participate in clinical trials.
Phase I Clinical Trials: The first trials in humans that test a compound for
safety, tolerance and pharmacokinetics. The trials usually involve normal,
healthy volunteers.
Phase II Clinical Trials: Pilot studies to define efficacy and safety in selected
populations of patients with the disease or condition to be treated, diagnosed,
or prevented.
Phase III Clinical Trials: Expanded clinical trials intended to gather additional
evidence of effectiveness for specific indications and to better understand
safety and drug-related adverse effects.
Phase IV: Studies performed after a drug is approved for marketing. Studies
are used to determine incidence of adverse reactions and long-term effects of
the drug and for marketing comparisons against other products and uses.
Preclinical studies: Studies that test a drug on animals and other nonhuman
test systems.
Treatment IND: Mechanism for FDA to allow use of investigational products
in expanded access protocols, which are generally unrestricted studies to learn
more about a drug and provide treatment for people with immediately lifethreatening or otherwise serious diseases for which there is no real alternative.
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APPENDIX 2: Legislation Guide
Food and Drugs Act (1906): The first drug law. It required only that drugs
meet standards of strength and purity. The burden of proof was on the government to show that a drug’s labeling was false and fraudulent before it
could be taken off the market.
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (1938): Under this law, manufacturers were required for the first time to prove the safety of a drug before it could
be marketed. This congressional action was prompted by the “elixir sulfanilamide” tragedy of 1937 in which over 100 people died from a poisonous ingredient in the product.
Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments (1962): Considered the most significant
change to U.S. drug law, the drug amendments of 1962 required drug manufacturers to demonstrate effectiveness for the product’s intended use as well
as its safety.
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act (1980): Established that inventions owned by the government remain the property of the agencies that
produce them. Also provided guidelines and priorities that encourage commercialization of government inventions through the licensing of technology to
U.S. businesses.
Bayh-Dole Act (1980): Authorized federal agencies to execute license agreements with commercial entities to promote the development of federally owned
inventions and to collect royalties for such licenses. Business, universities and
nonprofit organizations can retain title to and profit from inventions arising
from their federally funded research; however, the government retains the right
to use the inventions without paying royalties.
Orphan Drug Act (1983): Allowed drug manufacturers to receive seven-year
marketing exclusivity and tax deductions for the majority of the clinical trial
costs for drugs and other products for treating rare diseases. Financial incentives are intended to encourage research and development of these “orphan”
drugs which provide little or no profit to the manufacturer but may benefit
people with these diseases.
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (1984): This law
allowed generic drug approval under abbreviated new drug applications, making it less costly and time-consuming for generic drugs to reach the market. The
law also provided restoration of lost patent protection for innovator products.
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (1992): Established fees, including establishment fees, application fees, and products fees, to be paid by manufacturers. Fees were used to expand staff and quicken the new drug application
review process.
FDA Modernization Act (1997): Contained sweeping changes to Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act of 1938, including the reauthorization of the Prescription
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Appendix 2, continued

Drug User Fee Act. The act also codified FDA’s accelerated approval regulations and required guidance on fast-track policies and procedures.
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act (2003):
Established a new voluntary outpatient prescription drug benefit under Medicare that will go into effect in 2006. Created a transition program involving
drug discount purchasing cards effective in 2004. Replaced average wholesale price (AWP) as basis for prescription drug reimbursement under Part B
with average sales price (ASP).
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